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Recent Decisions
Bankruptcy - Judgment Creditor May Go Behind His
Judgment To Show That, Due To The Underlying Trans.
action, The Debt Is Not Barred By Discharge In Bankruptcy. United States Credit Bureau v. Manning, 305 P. 2d
970 (Cal. App. 1957). Plaintiff brought this action to renew
a judgment recovered on a note given by defendant to
cover funds which he had held as an agent and which he
had misappropriated. Defendant pleaded that the judgment debt was barred by a subsequent discharge in bankruptcy since it did not appear on the face of the judgment
that the original debt was based on fraud or defalcation.
(Section 17a (4) of the Bankruptcy Act specifically provides
that debts so incurred are not released by a bankruptcy
discharge. 11 U. S. C. A., Sec. 35a(4)). The lower court
permitted plaintiff to introduce extrinsic evidence of the
origin of the original indebtedness but rendered judgment
for the defendant. On appeal, held, reversed. Although the
weight of authority is contra, California is aligned with the
minority view that the nondischargeable character of the
original indebtedness may be shown by evidence dehors
the record of the judgment or judgment proceedings. The
note was given as evidence of the debt growing out of the
defalcation and not as satisfaction thereof. The majority
view is fallacious since in an action on the note if the defense of bankruptcy were raised it would be permissible to
show that the underlying debt was created by fraud or
other excepted cause, and the rendition of judgment does
not change the character of the indebtedness. (Citing
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Golombosky, 133
Conn. 317, 50A. 2d 817 (1946)).
Constitutional Law - Court Rule Prohibiting Taking
Of Photographs Within 40 Feet Of Courtroom Is Not A
Violation Of Freedom Of The Press. In Re Mack, 386 Pa.
251, 126 A. 2d 679 (1956). Defendants were attached for
criminal contempt for violating a court order prohibiting
the taking of photographs inside or within forty feet of
the entrance to a courtroom by photographing a convicted
criminal on his way to receive sentence. The photographs
were taken by infra-red light and caused no disturbance.
On appeal, held, modified and affirmed. The freedom of the
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press is subject to reasonable rules to maintain the dignity
of the court and the orderly administration of justice, and
the rule in question was reasonably related to this aim and
within the power of the court. Also, the court was charged
with a duty to protect the right of privacy of the prisoner,
a right unaffected by his status and which he was unable,
under involuntary restraint, to protect for himself.
The Pennsylvania court cited the 1927 decision of the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Ex Parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114,
136 Atl. 312, 51 A. L. R. 356 (1927). Certain photographers
had taken a flash picture of an accused murderer outside
the courtroom door and had taken others within the courtroom during the course of the trial with a concealed camera,
Subsequent to the taking of the first picture but prior to its
publication and to the taking of the pictures in court, the
trial judge prohibited the taking of pictures and requested
the surrender of the one taken. These pictures were published and the trial court found the photographers and
publishers guilty of contempt. In dismissing the appeals
from this action the Court of Appeals held that the court
was within its power to issue such orders to protect the
dignity and decorum of the tribunal and to protect the
prisoner and other participants from an unnecessary and
perhaps objectionable degree of publicity. Cf. Rules of the
Supreme Bench of Baltimore City (1947), Rule 3.
Criminal Law - McNaghten Test Of Criminal Insanity
Will Not Be Modified To Permit Defense That Conduct Was
Product Of Mental Disease. Cole v. State, ...... Md ....... 128
A. 2d 437 (1957). Defendant was charged with the brutal
rape of a four year old girl, to which he pleaded not guilty
by reason of insanity. He was admittedly sane under the
McNaghten test, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843),
being able to distinguish between right and wrong, but
sought to introduce in evidence testimony that his conduct
was the product of a mental disease. The proffer was rejected and the defendant was adjudged guilty. On appeal,
held, affirmed. Maryland adheres to the McNaghten test,
and modification must be left to the legislature.
The court's refusal to modify the McNaghten test was
consistent with their earlier rejection of the irresistible
impulse modification [Spencer v. State, 69 Md. 28, 13 A. 809
(1888)] and the Durham v. United States, 214 F. 2d 866
(D. C. Cir., 1954) test of whether the act was the product
of the mental disease [Thomas v. State, 206 Md. 575, 112 A.
2d 913 (1955)]. See, generally, XV Md. L. Rev. 44, 255
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(1955, 1956). Two recent federal cases should also be noted.
In Andersen v. United States, 237 F. 2d 118 (9th Cir., 1956),
the Ninth Circuit aligned itself with the majority. The
court remarked at page 127, "This Court has no desire to
join the courts of New Hampshire and the District of
Columbia in their 'magnificent isolation' of rebellion against
McNaghten, even though New Hampshire has been travelling down that lonesome road since 1870." In Douglas v.
United States, 239 F. 2d 52 (1956), the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit held that by adopting the
product test in the Durham case, the court did not intend
to bar evidence framed in terms of the McNaghten test, and
that it is still proper to receive evidence in terms of the
latter. See also American Law Institute Model Penal Code,
Tentative Draft No. 4 (1955), Sec. 4.01.
Domestic Relations - Action For Deceit Will Lie For
Fraudulent Inducement To Enter Into Void Marriage
Followed By Cohabitation. Spellens v. Spellens, 305 P. 2d
628 (Cal. App. 1956), reh. den. 1957. Defendant had induced
plaintiff to divorce her husband on the promise that he
would marry her and support her and her children. While
the decree of divorce was yet interlocutory, he took her to
Mexico where they went through a marriage ceremony
which he represented would be valid everywhere but
which he knew to be a nullity. The parties then returned
to California where they lived as man and wife about a
year, during which period the defendant was extremely
cruel to her. He then suggested that they separate, informing her that their marriage was a nullity. Eventually plaintiff brought suit to have the marriage declared valid and
to obtain separate maintenance, or in the alternative, if
the marriage were invalid, for damages for fraud. Other
causes of action were later added. The lower court granted
defendant's motion for non-suit of the fraud claim on the
ground that it was barred by WEST'S ANN. Civ. CODE, Sec.
43.5(d) as an action for breach of promise of marriage. On
appeal, held, reversed. The action is not for breach of promise to marry but for fraud inducing plaintiff to enter into
the marriage relation. An innocent woman who is induced
by fraud to contract a void marriage and who subsequently
cohabits with her putative spouse in performance of her
conjugal obligations is entitled to recover damages in an

action for fraud. [Citing inter alia, RESTATEmENT

OF TORTS,

Sec. 555]. There having been a confidential relationship
between the parties, the misrepresentation of law as to the
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validity of the marriage is fraudulent. The action may be
maintained regardless of the fact that no financial loss is
shown, since the woman so imposed upon has suffered a
change in status by being enticed into a meretricious liaison.
The case solves the problem of how to compensate the
deceived party, since there having been no marriage, no
alimony may be awarded, and the promises which induced
the divorce and remarriage are unenforceable as against
public policy. The action for fraud in this case was in addition to a recovery of one half of the property accumulated
during the existence of the putative marriage, a recovery
allowed by equitable analogy to the community property
rules which would have applied had the marriage been
valid.
Domestic Relations - Cohabitation Pursuant To A
Second Marriage Following A Voidable Divorce Is Not
Adultery For Purposes Of Recrimination If The Party
Acted In Good Faith; Harmon v. Harmon, 245 N. C. 83,
95 S. E. 2d 355 (1956). H, a domiciliary of North Carolina,
brought an action for divorce there against W a domiciliary
of Florida, based on a separation of more than two years.
An affidavit for service by publication was made, giving
W's proper Florida address. Publication was duly made in
a North Carolina paper. W filed no answer, and H was
granted an absolute divorce. Several weeks later, H married. W then appeared and moved to vacate the divorce
decree on the ground that the court clerk had failed to send
her a copy of the notice of service by publication as required by North Carolina statute. The court held that the
service of process was incomplete and set aside the decree.
The clerk was ordered to comply with the statute, and W
was given time in which to answer. In her answer W admitted that she and H had lived apart more than two years,
but alleged as a bar to the relief sought by H that he had
committed adultery by cohabiting with his second wife.
The court over W's objection charged the jury as a matter
of law that the relations between H and his second wife
between the time the divorce decree was rendered and set
aside would not constitute adultery unless H knew or should
have known that the decree was invalid and his second
marriage ineffective. Verdict and judgment were for H
and W appealed. Held, affirmed. Cohabitation pursuant to
a second marriage constitutes adultery if the parties to the
second marriage obtained the divorce decree through collusion and in bad faith or by fraud. There being no evi-
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dence that H acted otherwise than in good faith, though
the first marriage was valid and subsisting, his second marriage and cohabitation will not bar the divorce.
Since Maryland holds that recrimination is no defense
to a suit on grounds of voluntary separation (and, possibly,
other non-culpatory grounds: insanity, imprisonment), the
specific Harmon situation could not arise here. Matysek v.
Matysek, 212 Md. 44, 128 A. 2d 627 (1957). For divorce on
culpatory grounds, compare Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134
Md. 453, 462, 107 A. 185 (1919), holding that marriage and
cohabitation with a second wife under the mistaken belief
that the conviction and imprisonment of the first dissolved
their marriage was adultery which recriminated the husband's later action for divorce, but stating: "We are not
prepared to hold, however, that in no case should relief be
granted, because it is shown that the plaintiff had sexual
intercourse with a woman other than his real wife, if it
was the result of a bona fide mistake of fact which led the
husband to marry the other woman and cohabit with her,
in the full belief that she was his lawful wife - provided
the circumstances were such that he was justified in his
belief that the first marriage had ended and that he had not
been negligent or lax in endeavoring to ascertain the actual
facts before he entered into the second marriage."
Domestic Relations - Provision In Divorce Decree
Stating Child Must Be "Reared In Catholic Religion" Held
Too Vague. Lynch v. Uhlenhopp, 78 N. W. 2d 491 (Iowa,
1956). While divorce proceedings were pending, petitioner
and her husband entered into an agreement providing that
she should have custody of their younger son and that "the
said child shall be reared in the Roman Catholic Religion."
This agreement was subsequently incorporated in the
divorce decree. Petitioner did not take the child to a
Roman Catholic church but instead sent him to a Congregational church. She was found guilty of contempt and
brought certiorari proceedings to review the judgment.
Held: writ sustained. To be enforceable by contempt proceedings, a decree must be so clear, definite, and specific
that the petitioner could readily understand it and so be
capable of performing what was required of her. Since the
provision in question embodies such vague terms as "religion" and "reared", the exact duties of the plaintiff are
unclear, and the provision is void for lack of certainty.
Although not necessary to this decision, enforcement would
also violate the freedom of religion provisions of the First
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Amendment of the federal Constitution as made applicable
to state action by the Fourteenth. Four of the nine justices
dissented.
This appears to be a case of first impression on the particular problem involved. The cases in this general area are
collected and discussed by Pfeffer in Religion in the Upbringing of Children, 35 Boston U. L. Rev. 334 (1955),
which at pages 358-360, foreshadowed the dictum in the
opinion above.
Insurance - Successive Collisions With Three Motorcycles Being Driven In Echelon Is One Accident Within
Automobile Liability Policy. Truck Insurance Exchange v.
Rohde, 303 P. 2d 659 (Wash., 1956). Insured, while operating his automobile in a negligent manner, collided successively with three motorcycles being driven in echelon
about seventy-five feet apart. His insurance company,
whose liability was limited to $50,000 bodily injury and
$5,000 property damage for each occurrence or accident,
sought a declaratory judgment to determine the extent of
its liability. The trial court held that there was a separate
accident or occurrence as to each motorcycle, to each of
which the policy limits applied. On appeal, held, reversed.
The terms "accident" and "occurrence" included all injuries or damage within the scope of a single act of negligence, regardless of the fact that separate defenses (such as
last clear chance or contributory negligence) might exist
as to each motorcycle driver. Three of the eight justices
dissented on the grounds that insurance contracts should
be construed to favor the insured and that the event itself,
rather than the proximate cause, should be considered.
Motor Vehicles - The decision in Boone v. United
States, 235 F. 2d 939 (4th Cir., 1956), reported in the last
issue of the REviEw (Vol. XVII, p. 88), holding that a motor
vehicle obtained by embezzlement was stolen within the
meaning of the Dyer Act, has been upheld in United States
v. Turley, 77 S. Ct. 397 (1957), decided after the RmrVEw
had gone to press.
Taxation - Shareholder Compelled To Pay As Guarantor On Note Of Insolvent Corporation May Deduct Only
For A Short Term Capital Loss. Putnam v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, 77 S. Ct. 175 (1956). Petitioner, a lawyer, guaranteed the notes of a newspaper corporation in
which he owned stock. The corporation became insolvent
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and he was compelled to pay the notes. The Commissioner
determined that the loss was a nonbusiness bad debt to be
treated as a short term capital loss, and his determination
was sustained by the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit (224 F. 2d 947). Due to a conflict
in the circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed. When the guarantor pays the debt, the result is
not a new debt but, by subrogation, a shift of the old. The
loss thus sustained is by nature a loss from the worthlessness of a debt and not an ordinary loss in a transaction
entered into for profit.
The majority further justified their position by pointing
out that there was no real or economic difference between
the loss of a loan made directly to a corporation and one
made indirectly in the form of a guaranteed bank loan.
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, felt that the nonbusiness
bad debt provision was intended to prevent the deduction
of "family" or "friendly" loans which were in reality gifts
and not to remove the type of loan here involved from the
loss section.
Taxation - Tax Court Must Follow The Decisions Of
The Court Of Appeals Of The Appropriate Circuit. Stacey
Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner of Int. Rev., 237 F. 2d
605 (6th Cir., 1956). In a prior case, the decision of the Tax
Court had been reversed by the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit. In the present case, the Tax Court found
the facts to be the same and acknowledged the rule laid
down by the Court of Appeals, but declined to follow it.
On petition to review, held, reversed and remanded. The
desire of the Tax Court to establish a uniform rule does
not empower it to disregard the decisions of the several
reviewing courts of appeal, which must be followed by the
Tax Court as by the district courts until reversed by the
Supreme Court.
Torts Hospital Held Liable As Employer For
Negligence Of Technician In Blood Test. Berg v. New York
Society for Relief of Ruptured and Crippled, 1 N. Y. 2d 499,
136 N. E. 2d 523 (1956). Plaintiff sued defendant hospital
and others for injuries resulting from the negligence of a
technician in connection with a blood test preparatory to a
transfusion. The technician was a salaried employee who
had received four to six weeks training and whose work
was of a routine nature. Judgment was for plaintiff (136
N. Y. S. 2d 528) and the hospital appealed. The Appellate
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Division of the Supreme Court reversed (286 App. Div. 783,
146 N. Y. S. 2d 548). On appeal, held, reversed. The New
York rule that non-proprietary hospitals are exempt from
liability for negligent acts or omissions of physicians and
nurses in their professional medical capacities [Schloendorif v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E.
92 (1914)], does not apply to non-professional employees
such as this technician, though performing a "medical act".
The Maryland rule gives much broader immunity and
denies any recovery against a hospital even by a paying
patient. In resisting an attempt to liberalize this rule, the
Court of Appeals in Howard v. South Balto. Gen. Hosp.,
191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 574 (1948), held that, whatever the
merits of the argument as an original proposition, the court
was bound by prior decisions and the fact that the legislature in 1947 had refused to enact a statute to prevent the
pleading of the immunity. The legislature enacted instead
Md. Code (1951), Art. 48A, Sec. 82, which has been interpreted in Gorman v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance
Co., 210 Md. 1, 121 A. 2d 812 (1956), noted in 17 Md. L.
Rev. 159 (1957), supra, to mean that a hospital carrying liability insurance is estopped to assert its immunity
to the extent of the collectible insurance. The general
subject is discussed in 25 A. L. R. 29 which notes at page
160 that the leading case in Maryland, Perry v. House
of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885), was decided on the authority
of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Cl. & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep.
1508 (1846), which had already been repudiated on that
point in England. For the trend in this area in another
jurisdiction, see Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Oh. St.
467, 135 N. E. 2d 410 (1956).
Torts - Release Under Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act Reduces Excess Verdicts And Discharges
Verdicts Smaller Than Voluntary Settlements. Daugherty
v. Hershberger,126 A. 2d 730 (Pa., 1956). A, B and C, were
involved in a three-car collision. A and his six passengers
negotiated settlements of their claims against C which were
approved by the court. Pursuant to the settlements, the
claimants executed releases in favor of C in accordance
with the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act
(12 P. S. Sec. 2082 et seq.), discharging C and providing
that the damages recoverable against all other tortfeasors
were reduced to the extent of C's pro-rata share, i.e., 50%.
Suits were then instituted by claimants against B, the joint
tortfeasor. The cases were consolidated, and resulted in a
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total verdict $1,780.01 less than C's settlement, the individual claimants receiving amounts from $1,220.23 more
than the settlement to $3,000 less. B moved to compel
reduction of the excess verdicts by half and to compel
discharge of the remainder. The claimants contended that
the releases to C provided for a reduction of the damages
recoverable against others only to the extent of 50% of
such damages, irrespective of the amounts recovered by
settlement. The lower court agreed, but on appeal, held,
reversed. Under section 4 of the Uniform Act, B is entitled
to a reduction of the excess verdicts by 50% and discharge
or satisfaction of the remainder. At common law an injured party could have but one satisfaction for an injury,
and a release in consideration of satisfaction by one tortfeasor released all others liable for the same injury. The
Uniform Act merely enables an injured party to settle with
one or more, and, subject to the act, retain his right of
recourse against the remaining tortfeasors for additional
compensation. One of the six justices dissented on grounds
that B, the tortfeasor, was benefiting by C's generosity or
miscalculation and that the holding of the majority would
discourage claimants from settling.
The Uniform Act was adopted in Maryland in 1941,
[Md. Code (1951) Art. 50, Sec. 20 et seq.], but this is the
first case in which a court of last resort in Maryland or elsewhere has been called upon to interpret the reduction
clause of section 4 (Sec. 23) in a case of this type. In
Maryland Lumber Co. v. White, 205 Md. 180, 107 A. 2d 73
(1954), involving an order of satisfaction for which one
tortfeasor, who was prima facie liable, had paid $400.00,
the Court of Appeals noted at page 199: "Before the statute,
the appellees would have been entitled to only one satisfaction for the tort, even though two or more parties might
have contributed to causing their loss, and this rule is not
changed by the statute relating to contributions." The
court held (p. 200) that the order of satisfaction was a release within the meaning of Section 23 and that ". . . the
claim against the other tortfeasor should be reduced by the
amount of the consideration paid for the order of satisfaction." (Presumably the $400 was less than 50% of the claim).

